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1. Introduction 
In the decades preceding the 2007-2009 international financial crisis and the related ‘doom loop’ between the 
European sovereign debt crisis and the European banking sector crisis (2010-2013), the external financing of 
the ‘real’ activities in the continental part of the European Union (EU) and – in particular – in the euro area 
(EMU) was focused on bank credit. Moreover, in that same area many banking groups had a dominant role 
(along with some insurance companies) in the management of household financial wealth.  
 
This set-up of the EMU’s financial markets is not only different from that of other economically advanced areas 
(primarily the United States); it has also been of crucial importance in supporting the euro area’s economic 
growth. While denouncing inefficiencies, this specific European set-up has, in fact, allowed for the use of 
substantial portions of private wealth for productive purposes: the banks’ creation of means of payment by-
passed or – at least – mitigated the financial constraints potentially created by the qualitative gaps between 
the allocation of financial portfolios, selected by the majority of European wealth holders, and the composition 
of credit demand, carried out by the majority of non-financial firms in the various member states. This 
intermediation role, which justifies the existence of banks even in the theoretical models of general or partial 
equilibrium, has proved particularly valuable for European small and medium-sized non-financial firms 
which have had predominant influence in the productive apparatus of many EU’s member states. In fact, these 
types of firms encountered particularly severe difficulties in obtaining direct financing from financial wealth 
holders.    
 
Today, in the EMU financial markets, banks continue to enjoy the double quasi-monopolistic position just 
described. In this paper I maintain, however, that, in the subsequent stages of the abovementioned crises 
(starting in 2014), the role of the banking sector in the European financial markets began to undergo profound 
and irreversible changes and, therefore, is intended to lose its dominant influence in the external financing of 
productive activities and in the management of private financial wealth. If my interpretation of the imminent 
evolution in European financial markets was correct, it would mean that the structure of these markets will 
have to undergo profound changes. On the other hand, it should be stressed that, in many euro-area countries, 
small and medium-sized non-financial firms continue to play prominent roles. Therefore, alternative sources 
of financing of the European ‘real’ economy will have to be established; at the same time, however, the new 
non-bank financial institutions and the new bank business models will have to ensure that the role of financial 
                                                          
1 The first draft of this paper was discussed in a meeting on European Banking at OFCE, Paris (April 4th, 2019). I would like to 
thank the participants of this meeting for their stimulating suggestions. I would also like to warmly thank Salvatore Rossi 
(SEP-Luiss) for his careful reading and helpful comments on a more advanced draft. An Italian version of this paper will come 
out in a collective volume published by Donzelli, Rome.  
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intermediation, dominated until now by traditional banking groups, will continue to be active even if in 
different forms and with different results. 
 
This paper pursues a twofold objective: (i) to show that the evolution of European financial markets 
hypothesized above is reflected in a series of empirical descriptive data, which, though not providing clear-cut 
evidence in favor of our interpretation, make the latter plausible; (ii) to examine, with some detail, the main 
impacts that the transformation of the role of banks will have on the set-up of financial markets and on 
financial regulation in the euro area and in other parts of the EU (the so-called “Banking Union” (BU) and the 
so-called Capital Markets Union (CMU) process).  
 
In order to meet these two objectives, some data are provided on the configuration of the different segments in 
the EMU financial markets at the turn of the recent international and European crises, establishing a 
comparison with the United States (cf. Section 2). Combining the results of this comparison with a few other 
indicators relating to the European banking sector, it then emerges that the current financial structure of the 
euro area will be unable to reproduce itself without modification over time (cf. Section 3). The inevitable 
evolution in the role played by European banking groups, however, leaves a number of unsolved problems (cf. 
Section 4). To overcome these problems, the regulatory initiatives already undertaken by the European 
institutions are not enough; it will also be necessary to achieve a different division of labor among the new non-
bank financial intermediaries and the new functions carried out by the banking sector (cf. Section 5). This 
applies, in particular, to the Italian case, which is characterized by an extreme form of the problems that are 
typical of the euro area (cf. Section 6). The conclusions summarize the results achieved, pointing out that banks 
will continue to perform very important functions in the EMU financial markets even in the future.  
 
2. Some features of the financial markets in the EMU 
Although with some exceptions (France and a few other countries) and although with different incidence in 
the various member states, the non-financial firms of the euro area have so far shown a strong dependence on 
bank credit for their external financing. In this respect, it is sufficient to compare the composition of the 
financial debts of these same firms and of the corresponding US companies (cf. Table 1). We can easily verify 
that, between the end of the last century and the outbreak of the recent crises, on average bank loans 
accounted for nearly 30% of the total financing (debt and equity) of non-financial firms within the euro area; 
during the crises, this rate fluctuated between 33% and 38%, returning to around 30% in 2014 and aligning in 
2018 to the lowest values present in the final part of the 20th century. In the same periods, the average rate of 
bank loans (including mortgages) on the total financing of non-financial firms in the United States did not 
significantly exceed 10% (with the sole exception of 2008); indeed, this rate was often slightly above 8%. On the 
other hand, between the end of the last  century and the outbreak of the recent crises, on average euro-area 
firms made a very modest recourse to bond debts: the relative rate was usually below 3.5% of their total 
financing, and only in 2018 it reached the rate of 4%. In the same period, on average non–financial U.S. firms 
recorded rates of bond debts on their total financing that were never lower than 12% and – in some years – even 
higher than 15% (for example, 2002 and 2011).  
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The figures in Table 1 are reflected in those in Table 2, which shows the different rates of equities in relation to 
the total financial liabilities of non-financial firms in the euro area and the United States.2 In both areas the 
weight of firms’ equities issued on stock markets is directly correlated with cyclical changes in the market 
values of these same equities. This obvious similarity does not, however, weaken the profound differences 
between the two areas. From the end of the last century to the outbreak of the recent crises, the subset of non-
financial firms in the EMU utilized, to a limited and decreasing extent, funding through equities issued on 
regulated stock markets (less than 15% of the total funding, with the exception of two cyclical peaks in 1999 and 
in 2005); and, only after 2014, the rate of issued equities on regulated stock markets is slowly came closer to the 
pre-crisis thresholds. Conversely, in the periods being analyzed, the analogous subset of U.S. firms used equity 
financing to cover on average more than 50% of its total funding (with the exception of 2002 and 2011);3 and, in 
2018, it returned to a rate of issued equities on total funding equal to the maximum rate (over 60%) reached at 
the end of the last century. It follows that the negative gaps in the weight of equity financing between non-
financial euro area and U.S. firms ranged between 36 and 44 percentage points. 
 
 Table 1. Liabilities of non-financial firms:  debt typologies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: ECB and board of governors of the Federal Reserve (FED) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Table 2 would also make it possible to examine the specific weight of trade credits which are a form of financing within 
the whole set of firms. Here, however, there is no need to delve into the subject. It is sufficient to note that, for our purposes, 
the different forms of commercial credit are treated as self-financing for non-financial firms as a whole.    
3 As has already been noted, in those same years the lower incidence of equities was, at least in part, offset by the increased 
rate of bond financing. 
 Corporate 
bonds 
 Commercial 
paper 
 Municipal 
securities 
and loans 
Depository 
institution 
Loans
 Other 
loans and 
advances 
Total 
mortgages
Euro area  
MFIs 
Loans
Other credit 
Institutions 
Loans
2018-Q3 10,3% 1,2% 0,7% 4,0% 3,0% 1,5% 4,0% 11,8% 17,0%
2014-Q3 11,1% 0,5% 1,3% 2,1% 2,9% 1,0% 3,9% 14,1% 16,8%
2011-Q3 13,0% 0,5% 1,9% 2,1% 3,7% 2,2% 3,4% 18,1% 16,2%
2008-Q3 11,3% 0,6% 1,6% 3,0% 5,3% 3,5% 2,8% 19,1% 14,5%
2005-Q3 11,0% 0,5% 0,9% 2,4% 3,5% 2,8% 3,1% 15,6% 13,9%
2002-Q3 14,5% 0,7% 0,9% 3,9% 4,0% 2,3% 3,3% 17,7% 15,8%
1999-Q3 10,3% 1,2% 0,7% 4,0% 3,0% 1,5% 2,4% 16,0% 12,8%
Debt securities
Euro area 
Debt securities Loans
US
Loans
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Table 2. Liabilities of non-financial firms: equities 
Taxes 
payable
 FDI in U.S 
Total 
Miscellaneous 
Liabilities
Listed 
shares
Unlisted 
shares and 
other 
equity
2018-Q3 60.1% 5.7% 0.4% 4.6% 8.5% 16.1% 38.5% 8.2% 4.5%
2014-Q3 58.6% 5.4% 0.1% 7.5% 9.5% 14.8% 36.8% 8.3% 5.3%
2011-Q3 49.4% 6.6% 0.2% 9.0% 11.5% 11.5% 35.3% 9.9% 5.6%
2008-Q3 50.2% 6.6% 0.2% 8.3% 9.5% 14.1% 34.3% 10.2% 5.1%
2005-Q3 55.2% 6.7% 0.4% 6.3% 10.2% 17.5% 35.1% 9.7% 5.1%
2002-Q3 45.7% 7.9% 0.6% 7.5% 12.0% 14.9% 31.7% 10.7% 5.9%
1999-Q3 60.1% 5.7% 0.4% 4.6% 8.5% 21.8% 31.4% 10.1% 5.5%
Corporate Equity
Trade credits and 
advances
Other liabilities
US Euro area
Equity
Trade credits and 
advances
Other 
Liabilities
 
Sources: ECB and board of governors of the Federal Reserve (FED) 
This conclusion, however, should be qualified since Table 2 indicates that the gap between the two areas, in 
terms of equity financing of non-financial firms, would be resized if there was a more rigorous comparison, at 
first glance, than the one just proposed. In fact, euro-area data distinguish between listed and unlisted equities, 
while U.S. data merge all equities issued by non-financial firms without distinguishing between the two types. 
A simple calculation proves that, including even unlisted equities, the rate of the whole set of equities on total 
financing for euro-area firms would continue to show (with one exception) negative differences with respect 
to the similar rate for U.S. firms4. However, the gaps would not range between 36 and 44 percentage points but 
would rarely exceed 5.5 percentage points and, often (2005, 2008 and 2011), less than or equal to 2.6 percentage 
points.  
 
Although at first sight more rigorous, the latter comparison hides substantial problems. Much more often than 
in the United States, in the euro area financing through unlisted equities, i.e. equities not issued on regulated 
stock markets, implies that the non-financial firm is raising new capital through relationships which do not 
pertain to market transactions. The typical case is that of firms under family-control, where the new shares 
tend to be fully underwritten by the small core of existing owners - often with close parental ties - without any 
exchange in unregulated markets. Therefore, notwithstanding the precautions to be taken in the case of a 
comparison between heterogeneous data,5 it is appropriate to go back to the previous interpretation of Table 
2. Together with the evidence provided in Table 1, this allows us to offer a rough estimate of the shares of all 
market financing – i.e. the sum of bond debts and new capital arising from equities issued on stock markets – 
                                                          
4 Let us underline that, according to this different comparison, in 2002 the gap under consideration would be positive for 
European firms by almost 1 percentage point. 
5 In the calculations carried out in this and in the following section it has been arbitrarily but cautiously assumed that, in the 
United States, equities not issued on regulated or unregulated markets are around 20% of the total capital.  
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in the total external financing in the two areas examined. Over the last twenty years, the average weight of 
market financing on the total financing of EMU non-financial firms has almost always been around 30 
percentage points lower than the corresponding average weight on the total financing of US non-financial 
firms; over the last five years, this gap has reached more than 40 percentage points. 
 
The above empirical descriptive evidence can therefore be summarized in three aspects: 
(i) the incidence of the segment of bonds issued by non-financial firms (corporate bonds) is almost five times 
greater in the United States than in the euro area; 
(ii) the relative impact of stock markets is more than four times greater in the United States than in the EMU; 
(iii) the rate of bank financing is more than four times greater in the EMU than in the United States.   
 
3. The unviability of the current European financial set-up  
In addition to providing a snapshot by means of points (i) – (iii), Tables 1 and 2 suggest that in the six years that 
have elapsed from the long European recession (from the end of 2011 to mid-2013) the euro area has started to 
reduce – but at a very small pace – its heterogeneity with respect to the United States in the financial structure 
of non-financial firms. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the same point more clearly, by explicitly emphasizing the 
dynamics of the on time (static) data of the two previous tables. These dynamics show that non-financial firms 
in the euro area have minimally reduced their gaps with respect to firms in the United States concerning the 
utilization of market financing (corporate bonds and equities issued on the markets); they also show that there 
has been a more substantial, but still insufficient, reduction in the gap relating to the use of bank credit, partly 
due to the recent increase in the incidence of bank loans in the United States.   
Figure 1. Euro-area: liabilities of non-financial firms
 
Source: ECB 
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Figure 2. United States: liabilities of non-financial firms
 
Source: Fed board of Governors. 
 
These dynamics raise the obvious question: Are there compelling reasons why euro-area non-financial firms 
should look with concern at the persistence of their gaps in the incidence of market financing compared to 
their US competitors? This Section intends to provide an affirmative answer to the question by referring to two 
arguments. The first is that, in the post-crisis period, the specialization model of the European banking sector, 
based on a quasi-monopoly in the financing of the productive sector and in the management of the household 
financial wealth, is no longer sustainable. The second argument is that EMU non-financial firms need to catch 
up to their competitors in other economically advanced areas in the digital innovation and artificial 
intelligence fields; and to achieve these objectives, EMU firms have to mitigate their dependence on bank 
credit as a necessary condition to increase their average size and to strengthen their organization.6 
 
The first argument calls for a new comparison between the banking sectors of the euro area and the United 
States. As shown in Figure 3, the average profitability of the banking sector in the EMU was for several years 
(from 2013 to 2016) between less than one-tenth and one-third of that achieved by the banking sector in the 
United States, which has fluctuated around the 10% threshold between 2014 and today. In the last three years 
alone, the average profitability of European banks has exceeded the 6% threshold.  
                                                          
6 There is a third argument which does not directly concern our analysis and which is therefore overlooked here. One of the 
biggest problems of the EMU is that many 'core' member states reject centralized forms of risk sharing with the most fragile 
countries. A decentralized instrument for the absorption and dissemination of risks, resulting from cyclical or idiosyncratic 
shocks, could be represented by strong and well-organized financial markets (see, in this respect: Lannoo and Thomadakis 
2019).  
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
19
99
-Q
1
19
99
-Q
3
20
00
-Q
1
20
00
-Q
3
20
01
-Q
1
20
01
-Q
3
20
02
-Q
1
20
02
-Q
3
20
03
-Q
1
20
03
-Q
3
20
04
-Q
1
20
04
-Q
3
20
05
-Q
1
20
05
-Q
3
20
06
-Q
1
20
06
-Q
3
20
07
-Q
1
20
07
-Q
3
20
08
-Q
1
20
08
-Q
3
20
09
-Q
1
20
09
-Q
3
20
10
-Q
1
20
10
-Q
3
20
11
-Q
1
20
11
-Q
3
20
12
-Q
1
20
12
-Q
3
20
13
-Q
1
20
13
-Q
3
20
14
-Q
1
20
14
-Q
3
20
15
-Q
1
20
15
-Q
3
20
16
-Q
1
20
16
-Q
3
20
17
-Q
1
20
17
-Q
3
20
18
-Q
1
20
18
-Q
3
Debt securities Depository institution Loans Other Credit Institution Loans
Equity Trade credits and advances Other liabilities
 
 
7 
 
There are numerous factors explaining this further divergence between the EMU and the United States in the 
working of the banking sectors. One of the most important depends on the policy initiatives undertaken in 
early 2009. The newly established Obama administration decided on a radical 'cleaning’ of troubled financial 
securities held in the asset side of US bank balance sheets through three initiatives: the implementation of 
severe stress tests; the consequent obligation to proceed to recapitalizations, also with government support, if 
needed; and the introduction of incentives for the sale of these securities to public-private financial vehicles. 
Instead, in the same months, many national governments of the euro area and the EU allocated large public 
resources to recapitalize and guarantee the national banking sectors without achieving a similar 'cleaning’ of 
their balance sheets. Between 2011 and 2014 the consequent and persistent vulnerabilities of banks’ balance 
sheets in the EMU, especially those banks located in a few ‘core’ countries (e.g. Germany, Netherlands, 
France), combined with a dramatic increase in non-performing loans (NPL) induced by the European 
recession and the associated increase in defaulting borrowers, especially in the EMU ‘peripheral’ countries 
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain), as well as with banks holding an increasing amount of national 
government bonds, especially in countries with high public debt. This strengthened the ‘doom loop’ between 
banking crises and sovereign crises.  
 
This composition of European banking assets in frozen bank’s balance sheets polarized their exposure to risks. 
Most of the banks in the EMU sacrificed their profitability in the short term, implementing a delayed 
deleveraging of their troubled positions (NPE) and of other risky items in the asset-side of their balance sheets. 
Other EMU banks tried to safeguard their profitability in the short term, either by reproducing their 
investments in risky assets (e.g. Deutsche Bank) or by strengthening the concentration of their assets on 
national government bonds (for example, various Italian banks).   
 
Figure 3. The profitability (ROE) of the banking sector in the US and the EMU 
 
Source: Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (2019). 
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The impact of such fragility on bank profitability in the EMU may have been exacerbated by two additional 
factors: the announcement and the implementation of expansionary and unconventional monetary policies 
that, especially from the end of 2014 onwards, have pushed the structure of interest rates down and reduced 
the banks' interest margins; and the encumbrances of regulation that have imposed significant and difficult 
recapitalizations in a phase in which the average profitability of banks in the EMU was lower than the average 
cost of capital (cf. above, Figure 3) and that are still increasing the costs of bank funding7. Here, however, a 
further factor must be called into question: the recurrent crises and the failure to complete the BU have 
accentuated the national fragmentation of the euro-area financial markets, thus hampering both the 
rationalization of bank ownership and bank governance, as well as the reorganizations and consolidations of 
the banking groups. 8  
 
The result is that the EMU banking sector has difficulty in: (a) safeguarding its positions in payment systems 
from the strong competition raised by non-regulated technological enterprises; (b) selecting worthy 
borrowers, without chasing after those who do not need bank financing and rationing the remaining firms; (c) 
dealing with the unavoidable fall of profitability in the mass markets of ‘asset management’, due to the 
application of new rules (mainly, the so-called MIFID2); (d) reducing the many inefficiencies in business by 
means of internal reorganizations and mergers, including cross-border ones; (e) adapting its business model 
to new market opportunities, combining the traditional financing of productive activities with the provision 
of more sophisticated financial services. 
 
The inability to carry out points (a)-(e) implies that most of the small and average-sized EMU banks are still 
trapped in the traditional activities of funding, which, however, are constrained by the need not to accumulate 
new excessive NPLs; the medium-large and large European banking groups offer a more complex spectrum 
of activities that is based on business models (private wealth management and insurance services) destined to 
become less profitable if not for a few very large players, or for a few specialized banks; the small number of 
European banks of large international size focuses on investment activities that, as demonstrated – once again 
– by the U.S. case9, are no longer per se compatible with bank models of adequate profitability.  
                                                          
7 Various scholars argue that low or negative policy interest rates depress bank profitability directly (cf. for example 
Dell'ariccia et al. 2017; Kerbl and Sigmund 2017: Borio et al. 2017) or indirectly (cf. for example Altavilla et al. 2017; 
Eisenschmidt and Smets 2019). Other authors, however, concentrate on the possible negative impact of regulation (cf. for 
example Kashyap et al. 2010; Berger and Bouwman 2013; IMF 2015). In this regard, it should be recalled that the full 
implementation of the resolution procedures drawn up under the second pillar of the Banking Union (BU) requires a costly 
rearrangement of bank liabilities, which makes it possible to resort to bail-in; and today, with the urging of centralized 
supervision, the major European banks are moving in this direction.  
8 The BU process, launched in June 2012, has not yet completed the second pillar (cf. the previous note) and, above all, it 
has not progressed in the construction of a single European Deposit Guarantee Scheme (the envisaged third pillar). The 
point presented here (cf. also Bruni et al. 2017) is that this incompleteness has had effects contrary to the objective pursued: 
instead of accelerating the construction of a single European banking market, its national fragmentation has increased, thus 
blocking the consolidation between banks of different member states. 
9 One of the effects of the international financial crisis was that, in the United States, investment banks that escaped the 
Lehman bankruptcy (2008) were obliged by law to extend their functions also to commercial activities through internal 
reorganizations or mergers. Paradoxically, these changes also strengthened the investment functions of the former US 
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The above considerations support the view that the European banking sector no longer has the advantage of 
reproducing its previous models of specialization (cf. EBA 2015; Demiralp 2017; Calvo et al. 2018; Detragiache 
et al. 2018; de Haan e Kakes 2018). However, they also highlight another problem: in the euro area the current 
financial market structures do not even benefit the related 'real' economy. Even the most innovative firms in 
the EMU suffer from competitive lags compared to Chinese and U.S. companies in leading sectors such as 
digital technology and artificial intelligence and – more generally – in many network services. There are many 
reasons for these delays: the failure to complete the single market, the lack of a new policy for industry and 
services at a European level, excessive administrative burdens, and so on. Two other reasons, however, at least 
equally important, concern the financial markets: the amount and composition of potential European 
financing are not adequate in relation to the scale set by the other two main economic areas (China and the 
United States); as we will see below, most EMU firms are limited to being of a small and small-medium size.  
 
4. The main obstacles to financial reorganization in the EMU  
New innovative trajectories require technical and organizational changes which must be based on large 
public investments and an expensive set of financial support and services for potential innovators. To have any 
chance of success, innovators must be able to adapt their enterprises to different but critical dimensional 
thresholds. Therefore, if the EMU wants to catch up and remain a competitive economic area with a high 
growth potential, it is necessary that: financing of innovative trajectories is not quantitatively and/or 
qualitatively limited to self-financing and bank credit; successful companies and/or those with great potential 
are ready to increase their size, when needed, by means of internal or external reorganizations. In both cases, 
a necessary condition is that a broad spectrum of innovative financial support and services is offered, in a 
cooperative way, by the public and the private sector (cf. Kremer and Popov 2018). In their present set-up, 
differently from the U.S., the EMU financial markets do not have a composition that can meet the private 
demand for the most sophisticated financial services. The latter require an effective improvement of market 
segments and non-bank intermediaries, as well as new bank business models. 
 
What has just been said does not mean that the innovative pursuit of European productive activities is blocked 
by quantitative inadequacies in the stock of financial wealth or by lack of liquidity. On the contrary, today the 
euro area has an excess of net aggregate savings (over investments) that results, besides in large positive 
balances of the current account, in an excess of public and private liquidity. Moreover, the euro area has an 
aggregate amount of financial wealth that, if measured relative to GDP, is not much lower than that of the 
United States (cf. Table 3).  
                                                          
investment banks, which, as demonstrated by the serious difficulties now experienced by one of the few European 
investment banks (Deutsche Bank), in subsequent years became dominant in the international competition.  
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Table 3: Financial wealth to GDP ratio
Financial assets 
($, per capita)
Financial assets 
(% GDP)
France 91940,9 208,1%
Germany 84449,8 160,6%
Italy 78278,3 191,4%
Spain 51784,9 132,5%
Euro Area 79387,9 175,7%
United States 123986,5 207,4%
Financial assets held by household  (Q3-2018)
 
Sources: ECB, and Fed board of Governors. 
 
With regard to liquidity held in private hands, it should be noted that, over the last decade, in several ‘central’ 
EMU countries, the non-financial firms as a whole have achieved net positive financial balances, i.e. they have 
experienced excess liquidity and credits over debts. The phenomenon is attributable to various causes: some 
of the large companies, which traditionally operated in areas that are not financial, powered their profitability 
by investing in financial assets; other firms of various sizes have been streamlining their organizational 
processes to reduce the liquidity needs for their current operations; and still others have reduced their 
dividend policy and thus, expanded their self-financing margins. Perhaps the fundamental cause is that, 
during the crises, there was a reduction in the scale of productive activities and, above all, of ‘real’ investments, 
which, despite the lowering in the structure of interest rates, has not been fully reabsorbed in recent years of 
economic recovery. The result was that a number of large non-financial firms accumulated cash buffers, 
waiting to take advantage of investment opportunities with appropriate expected rates of profitability; and the 
more efficient small to medium-sized firms acted in a similar way, also due to the fact that the low interest rates 
made attractive only the financial investments that were too risky for them. These subsets of firms have 
certainly not suffered from a lack of bank credit.  On the other hand, however, another part of the firms and, in 
particular, the small and medium–sized firms that were less efficient or that were ready for a significant 
upgrading in their size, have been unable to cover their financing needs for the reorganization or 
restructuring of the production processes. 
 
The failure to meet the demand for financing of the latter subset of firms is due to two phenomena. First, as 
already mentioned in the previous Section, after the crisis the EMU banking sector initiated a delayed 
‘cleansing’ of its balance sheets, significantly reducing the provision of credit with respect to the pre-crisis 
period. In particular, European banks concentrated their loan supply towards firms that were less risky but 
that had a modest demand for credit because their financial balances were positive; on the other hand, these 
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same banks limited the credit for firms with high financial needs. Secondly, as we have already seen (cf. above, 
Section 2), in the EMU this reallocation in bank loans was not offset either by significant increases in the 
impact of the equity markets or by a strong expansion of the corporate bond market. In this respect, it is 
sufficient to note that – at the beginning of 2018 – the capitalization of companies in relation to GDP did not 
reach 37% in Italy, it slightly exceeded 60% in Germany and was less than 68% in Spain; only in France, the 
ratio of this capitalization to GDP was greater than 100% (106.5%) (see World Bank data). During 2018, the 
situation did not significantly improve since the negative trends in almost all the financial asset classes 
hindered new public offerings or other forms of recapitalization.  
 
As a result, although several EMU countries are experiencing an excess of financial assets for their non-
financial firms as a whole, the fall in bank lending has hampered the reorganization of a large portion of small 
and medium-sized firms in the industry and services sectors. Some further empirical evidence reinforces this 
conclusion (cf. ECB 2018; Maurin et al. 2018).  Although the average net profit rates for the small and medium-
sized European firms have increased during the last decade (from values close to zero in 2009 to 5% in 2017), at 
least one third of these firms maintain they have faced binding constraints in access to financing, and more 
than a quarter maintain they have suffered a rationing (quantity or price) in access to bank credit. Moreover, 
there is a gap of at least ten percentage points between the large and small to medium-sized European firms 
which claim to have received less than 75% of their demand for bank financing. 
 
Apparently, the large net private financial wealth available in the euro area should enable these problems to 
be overcome quickly. The availability of private financial wealth is in fact the prerequisite to build, even if with 
delay, strong and liquid non-banking segments of the EMU financial markets. In turn, the strengthening of 
the corporate bonds and equity markets makes available those funds that, unlike bank credit, have wide 
margins of quantitative expansion and provide that support and those services that must accompany the size 
upgrading and the technical and organizational innovations of successful firms.  
 
There are at least two obstacles to this evolution in the EMU financial markets.  
The first obstacle is due to the same dimensional structure of the European productive apparatus. The size of 
non-financial firms greatly varies in the member states of the euro area; for example, this average size is much 
larger in France than in Italy or Spain. However, as already mentioned and shown in Table 4, when compared 
with the U.S., the size structure of the aggregate of non-financial firms in the EMU is that of small and small-
to-medium size. On the other hand, bond and equity issues are characterized by strong economies of scale due 
to high regulatory and organizational fixed costs. Therefore, it is difficult that smaller firms will find direct 
access to market financing advantageous. The second obstacle, which reinforces the previous one, lies in the 
fact that the optimal portfolio composition of European wealth holders ill suits the potential sources of market 
financing of the productive sector. Non-financial EMU firms with positive financial balances have the 
advantage of providing credit to consumers, of supporting final demand or of making short-term investments 
to improve their profitability. EMU households tend to allocate a large part of their financial wealth to assets 
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that are less risky than buying corporate bonds or shares, especially if issued by not so large companies in 
market segments with poor liquidity.   
Table 4. Distribution of firms by size (USA and EMU)
1-9 10-19 20-49 50-249 250+
Industry (except construction) 1.535.217 81,8% 8,9% 5,3% 3,3% 0,7%
Construction 2.473.842 94,1% 3,9% 1,5% 0,4% 0,0%
Services 4.548.821 93,6% 3,8% 1,8% 0,7% 0,1%
Industry (except construction) 385.359 67,4% 13,5% 10,8% 6,6% 1,6%
Construction 624.091 83,5% 8,8% 5,3% 2,1% 0,2%
Services 1.044.380 80,1% 10,7% 5,9% 2,8% 0,5%
Total
Number of person employed
Euro Area (2016)
United States (2015)
 
Source: OECD. 
 
The second obstacle reinforces the first. We can thus conclude that the distribution of liquidity and the 
allocation of financial wealth, which is typical of the euro area, are neither perfect and immediate substitutes 
of traditional bank financing, especially for a crucial part of the firms in industry and services, nor efficient 
activators of those new financial instruments that are required to re-ignite sustainable growth in the EMU.  
 
This conclusion is nothing new. It is well known that small and medium-sized firms tend to favor bank credit 
as an external source of financing. And it is also well known that financial wealth holders tend to prefer assets 
with a higher degree of liquidity and a lower degree of risk than assets that meet the composition of the demand 
for financing major non-financial firms; and that the gap is even more marked for small non-financial firms 
that encounter difficulties in accessing market financing. These aspects have long offered a theoretical 
justification for the existence of banks and other financial intermediaries in traditional models of general 
economic equilibrium or in those of partial equilibrium with information asymmetries. The sets of non-
financial firms, on the one hand, and of holders of financial wealth, on the other, are not able to meet directly 
on the market precisely because of the incompatibility between the time structure and the risk profile of the 
financial assets requested and offered, or because of information imperfections. Therefore, an intermediation 
is necessary, one that is able to transform durations and to absorb the risk gaps by taking over their 
management (cf. for example: Brainard and Tobin 1963; Tobin 1969; Diamond 1984).  
 
5. The necessary evolution 
The European models, centered on banks as dominant financial intermediaries, have for a long time been an 
empirical confirmation of this theoretical result. For the reasons already discussed, however, these models 
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underwent profound transformations already at the end of the last century and are not reproducible in the 
post-crisis period. We should therefore ask whether a new division of labor between banks and non-bank 
intermediaries, aimed at reducing the gaps between the structures of financial markets in Europe and the U.S., 
will be able: to carry out, in new forms through the EMU financial markets, the functions of traditional 
banking, bridging the qualitative gaps between the allocation of financial wealth preferred by private holders 
and the demand for financing coming from small and small-to-medium sized non-financial firms; and to 
provide new financial instruments to support the size upgrading and the related innovations of European 
firms.  
 
During the crises and the years immediately following, European institutions already tried to build a legal-
regulatory framework that would facilitate the change of bank business models and the strengthening of non-
bank intermediaries, thus leading to a positive response to the two questions just raised (cf. for example: 
Draghi 2019). It was also recalled that the BU process, launched in mid-2012 and aimed at completing the 
integration of the banking sectors of the individual EMU member states, remained incomplete and ended up 
leading to a renationalization of the relative market segments. Even the unification process of EMU financial 
markets (the so-called Capital Markets Union: CMU) has not produced the expected results so far. Launched at 
the end of 2014, the CMU was designed to develop European non-banking segments and to encourage the 
creation or the strengthening of its non-banking intermediaries.10 The CMU resulted in a substantial set of 
legal and regulatory initiatives that, however, have not been able to deeply affect the functioning of European 
financial markets, except in some already more advanced countries (for example, France)11. In this respect, it 
is sufficient to recall the data on the modest growth of the European stock and bond markets mentioned above 
(cf. Sections 2 and 4); and add that, compared with the United States, in the euro area even the development of 
an instrument such as venture capital to support innovative investments has been very modest (cf. Figure 4). 
These delays and distortions in the impact of the BU and the CMU do not allow us to put off the solution for the 
financial problem of the EMU pointed out at the beginning of this Section: the banking sector will necessarily 
have to abdicate from its current oligopolistic positions to leave space for non-banking financial 
intermediaries or financial functions performed by non-financial firms (cf. also: von der Leyen 2019); and this 
                                                          
10 As several authors note (cf. for example: Lannoo and Thomadakis 2019, p. 6; and ECB 2015), the initial project and the 
2015 Action Plan focused on multiple areas of intervention. Here we recall four of them: (a) broadening the spectrum of 
financing accessible to non-financial European firms, including small and small-to-medium-sized ones; (b) facilitating the 
access and use of non-bank segments of the market; (c) strengthening, to this end, the involvement of institutional and 
professional investors and– through them – of retail investors; (d) expanding banking functions and the financing of 
innovative activities. 
11 As stated by Lannoo and Thomadakis (2019), to implement the planned measures (cf. the previous note), the European 
Commission set twenty targets and committed to translate them into thirty-three actions by 2019. Most of these legal-
regulatory actions have actually been drawn up and some of them have been approved. For example, the “European 
passport” was launched, procedures for issuing financial assets in regulated markets were simplified, markets for different 
types of companies were constructed, a market for simple and transparent securitizations was relaunched, sources of 
financing innovations were encouraged, transnational investment and those that are sustainable in the long term were 
facilitated. The effects produced were not, however, equal to the regulatory efforts made. 
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evolution will be successful and will contribute to the sustainable development of the euro area only if it is able 
to channel, with new methods, a significant portion of the financial wealth allocated in portfolios with a 
traditional and stable composition towards potential borrowers in the productive sector.   
 
Figure 4. Venture capital investments (billions of dollars)
 
* Malta and Cyprus are excluded 
Source: OECD 
 
In this respect, it has already been noted that some EMU countries are in stronger positions than those in the 
rest of the area. In France, Ireland and Luxembourg, the existing national financial markets have a richer pool 
of non-bank intermediaries, which means that non-financial firms in these countries are less dependent on 
bank credit than in Germany or Italy. On the other hand, in these countries, as well as in the Netherlands (as 
in other non-euro-area northern European countries), there are different types of institutional investors who 
manage a substantial amount of assets and already play an important intermediation role in the relative 
financial markets (cf. Darvas and Schoenmaker 2017). The fact remains that, for the EMU as a whole, at the end 
of 2018 pension funds held a modest amount of financial wealth in relation to total GDP; and this amount was 
used for even smaller shares in financing non-financial firms. In addition, although life insurance companies 
and investment funds in the EMU held overall higher financial assets than pension funds, at the end of 2018 
these investors again allocated overly low fractions of their portfolios to direct financing of non-financial firms, 
especially small and medium-sized and/or high-risk firms.   
 
These limits cannot be overcome by just having recourse to a new centralized regulatory framework such as 
that offered by the CMU. As shown by the French case, it is also effective to implement public policies 
incentivizing the institutional investors to allocate part of their portfolios to the market financing of small and 
medium-sized firms, easing and supporting banks’ transition to different business models and to related 
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changes in their organization, lowering the unit entry costs in the corporate bond and stock markets, and 
simplifying the governance and legal requirements that firms would have to satisfy to issue bonds and equities 
in the financial markets. Moreover, due to the current specificities characterizing various EMU countries, it 
would also be effective to develop national public policies aimed at removing local barriers to non-bank 
financing. For instance, in the Italian case, these barriers are also due to the prevailing ownership structure of 
small firms that does not allow for a separation between management and control; hence, public policies could 
incentivize this separation and the consequent upside in firms’ size.    
 
The conclusion is that future European financial setups will have to rely on a wider and more established 
spectrum of institutional and professional investors who are oriented to using their own financial resources or 
to reallocating those of their customers to support productive activities. Some of these investors and some of 
the new bank models will have to provide advisory services to the limited share of European non-financial 
companies that are in the condition to directly access the stock and/or corporate bond markets; these services 
will help those companies issue financial assets that meet the preferences of the less risk-averse sub-set of 
financial wealth holders (professional or retail investors). Other investors and intermediaries will instead have 
to act as underwriters of the bonds and/or equities issued by the larger number of European firms whose size 
or organization prevent them from obtaining direct access to regulated financial markets. In turn, these 
investors can finance their purchases by using their own resources and/or by issuing their own debt 
instruments, which are less risky and which can be allocated to different institutional investors or retail 
investors. Still other investors or new bank models may specialize in the financing of specific innovative firms 
(for example, start-ups). 
 
Given the dimensional composition of the European productive apparatus and the possible low propensity of 
local firms to ask for non-bank financing, it can be useful to provide some specification on the possible ways of 
giving small and medium-sized European firms indirect access to the financial markets.12  
 
In the case of bond issues, we should refer to “special purpose vehicles” (SPV), each of which is ready: (i) to plan 
centralized purchasing of corporate bonds issued by several small or small-to-medium-sized firms in amounts 
that, if taken individually for each of these firms and separately offered in the relative markets, would not 
exploit the possible economies of scale and would – therefore – not be attractive and efficient; (ii) to assess each 
of the possible bond purchases by means of information (hard and soft) on the different issuers, which would 
allow to order them in different  and specific risk groups; (iii) to refine these risk groups by also taking into 
account the riskiness of the specific issues and the expiration time of each of the corporate bonds offered; (iv) 
as a result of the processes in points (ii) and (iii), to decide the amount and the composition of the actual 
purchases by selecting the most interesting corporate bonds offered and by dividing them into various 
tranches of risk, and to decide a placement on the financial markets of their own bonds13 for an amount that 
will suffice to cover the decided purchases; (v) to actually carry out the decided purchases and sales. In this 
                                                          
12 The remaining part of the Section summarizes the analysis proposed in Messori (2018a) with regard to the Italian case. 
13 That is, the bonds to be issued by the SPV under examination. 
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way, in accordance with what the CMU suggested (cf. above, n. 11), a simple and transparent securitization 
market would be activated (cf. Figure 5).  
 
In the case of equity issues, it would be a matter of using those financial intermediaries (‘private’ or ‘public’ 
funds) that are able to perform, with respect to an amount of equities that are issued by several small or small-
to-medium-sized firms and that cannot be conveniently offered separately on the relative markets at favorable 
and efficient terms, functions (i) - (iii) allocated to the SPVs in the case of bond issues. These funds should then 
make their actual purchases of a part of the offered equities through bilateral private placements. The latter 
would be based on a preventive assessment of the minimum amount of equities in each of the risk groups that 
meets the liquidity requirements and the economies of scale. In order to finance the decided purchases, each 
of the intermediaries could use its available financial resources or place on the markets its own bonds or its 
own shares of capital (cf. Figure 6). The lenders of these fund issues would be the old and/or the new 
underwriters of the ‘private’ or ‘public' fund under examination and, in any case, professional or institutional 
investors.   
 
Figure 5: Bond issues of small or small-medium series  
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Figure 6: Equity issues of small or small-medium series 
 
 
6. The Italian case  
The possibility of indirect access to the non-banking segments of the financial markets will represent an 
important and special opportunity for the Italian productive sector in the near future. Three comments are 
sufficient in this respect. First of all, it is well known that, in Italy, the incidence of small and medium-sized 
firms, that is, the type of firms that have the most difficulties in directly accessing financial markets, is even 
higher than in the already high European average. In addition, and as a result, non-financial firms in Italy are 
dependent on bank credit as a source of external financing even more than the EMU average. Small and small-
medium Italian firms have a bank leverage that, in addition to being above the already excessive national 
average, is also higher than that of other small-and medium-sized European firms taken as a whole. Finally, 
especially after the end of the recession (i.e. after 2014), in Italy the dynamics of bank lending to the productive 
sector have not been positive. Although it is always difficult to assess whether such a dynamic is mainly due to 
decreases in the demand for credit from potential borrowers or to rationing of price and/or quantity by the 
banking sector, in the Italian case the fall in the ratio of bank credit to GDP was so significant that – in any case 
– this traditional form of financing supported neither economic growth nor firms’ innovations (cf. Bank of Italy 
2019a; and Figure 7).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Figure 7: Bank credit with respect to output and its trend 
(Quarterly data; percentage values) 
 
Source: Bank of Italy (2019a). 
 
The third remark can also be extended to other forms of external financing. The fragile financial structure of 
most Italian firms, especially the small and small-medium sized ones, has made access to stock markets and 
market debts problematic. The persistently low Italian capitalization even compared to a bancocentric country 
such as Germany has already been mentioned. Similar valuations can be extended to the corporate bond 
market. As highlighted by the Bank of Italy (2019a), the result was that – during the crises and in the years 
immediately following – Italian non-financial firms drastically reduced their external debt (leverage) without 
replacing it with adequate capital increases; their modest willingness to grow was therefore based on self-
financing. This trend is also confirmed by a recent survey of more than 360,000 firms that have a different legal 
form than the joint stock company and that started their activities between 2003 and 2010 (cf. Bonaccorsi Patti 
and Nigro 2018). For these young and small firms, the constraints on external financing have been particularly 
severe. The proof is that one third of their activities has been financed by internal resources and another third 
by commercial debts (cf. above, n. 2).    
 
It is superfluous to reiterate that, especially for productive activities open to innovation and to size upgrading, 
self-financing offers insufficient margins. Consequently, in many ways the Italian case represents an extreme 
form of European financial weaknesses. Moreover, a review of the data in Table 3 indicates that Italy would 
have the necessary amount of financial resources to overcome its fragility: it has one of the highest financial 
wealth/GDP ratios in the euro area. The dilemma is that, as highlighted by the Bank of Italy analyses on the 
composition of the assets and liabilities of firms and households in Italy (for the most recent update, cf. Bank of 
Italy 2019b), the allocation of these resources runs into – again, in extreme form –a problem characterizing the 
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European level: the extreme heterogeneity between the portfolios preferred by Italian households and the 
sources of financing selected by companies.    
 
As can be seen from the right-hand column of Table 5, at the end of 2018, Italian households had among the 
lowest levels in Europe of debt exposure compared to their assets (just above 75%). Therefore, these households 
seemed to enjoy the best conditions for a medium-to-long-term utilization of their financial assets. Conversely, 
they chose to hold 30% (or just under) of their financial wealth in bank deposits; less than a quarter of that 
wealth was instead allocated in insurance products or in the first or second pillar of social security, and slightly 
more than 11% in investment funds. Moreover, (even if less accurate) empirical evidence suggests that a very 
important part of the related available financial assets of insurance companies, retirement funds and 
investment funds was invested in fixed income (bonds, with a prevailing weight of sovereign debt bonds). If 
we compare this composition of the net assets of Italian households and of the main Italian institutional and 
professional investors with the composition of the liabilities of Italian non-financial firms (cf. the left column 
of Table 5), it will become clear how urgent it is to develop new forms of financial intermediation in order to 
diversify and strengthen the external sources of financing for the Italian productive sector.  
 
The conclusion justifies the opening statement of this Section: the possibility of indirect access to the non-
banking segments of the financial markets, as described above, represents a particularly important 
opportunity for small and medium-sized Italian firms. The CMU provides a legal and regulatory framework 
conducive to the exploitation of this possibility. However, it is necessary for Italian and European banks and 
non-bank intermediaries to be convinced that such an evolution is inevitable and advantageous; and for non-
financial firms to be ready to open up to the novelty.  
 
 7. Conclusions: the possible role of banks  
The last considerations might suggest an oversimplification of the issues impeding the solution to the 
problems discussed so far. In order to take advantage of the favorable legal and regulatory framework 
introduced by the CMU process, it is certainly not enough for financial intermediaries and productive firms in 
Italy and in the euro area to realize that it would be in their interest to open up to the changes in the European 
financial markets. These changes face, in fact, various institutional obstacles and must overcome intricate 
networks of national privileges. Hence, in an already very difficult context, resistance to novelty from banks, 
other financial intermediaries and productive activities would be decisive for preventing small and medium-
sized firms in the EMU and Italy from gaining indirect access to the non-banking segments of the financial 
markets. That is why, at the end of this paper, it is necessary to show that a richer articulation of the European 
financial markets would benefit all the different types of suppliers and borrowers.14  
 
 
 
                                                          
14 In the following, I resume the conclusions already reached in Messori (2018b). 
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Table 5. Assets and liabilities of households and firms in Italy (2018) 
Firms Households 
Assets % Flows Assets  % Flows 
Deposits and Money 19.5 17.037 Bank deposits 29.1 20.968 
Financial Assets:             
of which Italian 
3.2 
2.6 
-3.864 
-2.281 
Bonds 6.9 -8.654 
   Shares in mutual funds 11.5 1.362 
Capital shares and 
participations 
36.9 35.410 Capital shares and participations 21.3 -17,092 
Commercial Credit 33.5 11.021 Insurance, pension funds and 
severance 
23.7 26.489 
Other assets  7.0 991 Other assets  3.5 5.859 
Liabilities   Liabilities   
Financial debts 32.4 10.695 Short term debts  5.2 -1.036 
Bank Loans 18.0 -38,554 Medium and long-term debts 71.3 18.013 
Other Loans 10.4 53.429 Other Liabilities 23.4 2.719 
Assets 4.0 -4.180    
Capital shares and 
participations 
47.2 10.650    
Commercial debts 15.0 10.597    
Other Liabilities 5.3 3.632    
Source: Bank of Italy 2019b. 
 
Firstly, as the example of the United States shows, strengthening non-banking segments in European 
financial markets would still allow some banks to continue to perform their current traditional functions in a 
more specialized context. Even in the most complex financial markets, there are in fact certain types of 
households and companies that prefer to resort to traditional banking intermediation in order – respectively – 
to efficiently allocate their financial wealth and to obtain the financing needed. This applies, in particular, to 
that part of financial wealth holders that is most risk-averse and to a substantial number of small and small-
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medium-sized firms that are difficult to fit into standardized risk classes. The new functioning of a more 
advanced and more integrated European financial market will therefore continue to attribute important 
functions to the banking sector, even if it breaks its oligopolistic dominance. Banks and non-bank financial 
intermediaries will not only have to compete but will also have to perform complementary functions. 
 
Secondly, it is inconceivable that the transition from the old European model centered on banks to the new 
functioning of financial markets characterized by coexistence and complementarity between different types 
of financial intermediaries will result in a short-term and linear process of partial substitution among banks 
and non-bank intermediaries. It is instead reasonable to forecast a bumpy and complex evolution that will take 
a long time before being completed. During this evolution, banking sectors will be called upon to play crucial 
roles that will potentially be very profitable for them. In fact, due to their past oligopolistic dominance in the 
national financial markets, the EMU banks have accumulated strong informational advantages and more 
deep-rooted expertise in the selection of potential borrowers than other non-bank financial intermediaries (cf. 
for example: Stiglitz and Weiss 1984). On the other hand, due to their previous marginal roles, the latter 
intermediaries will not have the immediate availability of the specific ‘technologies’ required to reduce their 
gaps with regard to the banks in terms of information and selection capacity. They can, of course, acquire such 
‘technologies’ even without the cooperation of banks; in that case, however, they must make investments that 
are costly and that will produce actual results only in the medium-to-long term.  
 
Thirdly, even once informational and ‘technological’ gaps – in one way or another – are bridged, it would be 
hard for non-bank financial intermediaries to gain market shares by putting themselves in direct conflict with 
the European banks. The latter have built medium-to long-term relationships with their borrowers over time, 
often on both sides of the financial markets. Therefore, in order to replace in a non-cooperative way banks in 
the supply of specific financial services, other intermediaries would have to persuade bank customers to 
abandon their usual choices in order to give preference to new and unknown economic agents. Moreover, 
these non-bank intermediaries would expose themselves to the reaction of banks, which, using their pre-
existing and consolidated market position, would tend to adopt an aggressive policy of lowering prices in the 
short term (‘predatory’ policy) for the sole purpose of preventing or delaying the entry of competitors.    
 
As a rule, transitions from old to new market organizations do not foster cooperative behavior among existing 
(quasi-)monopoly holders and new entrants, even in cases when cooperation proves ex post advantageous for 
almost all the actors involved. In those cases, the entry conditions of the new suppliers are met only after costly 
resistance from the old suppliers. In principle, this should also apply to the transition from the old to the new 
form of organization of the European financial markets. In this particular case, however, there are specific 
factors that facilitate cooperation, prompting the old supplier (the banks) to immediately give up a war of 
position and thus make the transition process faster and more efficient. Some of these factors have been 
examined in the course of this paper: the new regulation and supply conditions in European financial markets 
are eroding the profitability of the EMU banks so that the reproduction of the old banking model will no longer 
be advantageous over time. Furthermore, by deciding to transfer a part of their expertise in the form of services 
to non-bank financial intermediaries, the EMU banks would provide themselves with a new rich source of 
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revenue. An acceleration of the transition process, based on cooperative behavior, would therefore improve 
the position of all the market players (a rare example of the Pareto improvement).      
 
This last statement can be summarized and qualified by the following three steps.  
 
Firstly, the EMU banks have both a short-and medium-long-term expediency in offering services to other 
financial intermediaries in order to transfer to these non-bank intermediaries a large part of their information 
and expertise and in order to facilitate the transition to a richer articulation of the European financial markets. 
In fact, in the short term, the banks will receive a double advantage: they will be able to cash in high revenues 
from the services offered, which concern information and skills related to activities to be disposed of or 
otherwise to be closed; they will be helped in selecting activities that will be the basis of their new business 
models. These new activities will not be related to informational transfers or to the sharing of skills. In the 
medium-to-long term, the banks will thus be able to eliminate, with profits, a part of their old activities that 
are no longer profitable and focus on the new and profitable specializations.   
 
Secondly, for the reasons mentioned above, each of the non-bank financial intermediaries has a clear 
advantage in purchasing a part of the services offered by the banks. In doing so, this intermediary bears costs 
that are lower than the combination of the two alternative costs: those to be incurred for making the 
investments required to overcome the information and competence lags accumulated with respect to the 
banks; those to be incurred for entering into competition with these same banks. Moreover, by purchasing 
bank services, non-bank intermediaries save the time that would have been necessary to accumulate 
adequate information and expertise and minimize the risk of going in false directions and suffering predatory 
pricing policies. 
 
Thirdly, non-financial firms also benefit from a cooperative transition to more structured European financial 
markets. They can thus benefit from a wider range of financial services that are offered by more specialized 
intermediaries, and in a shorter time than that required in the case of a conflictual transition.  
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